

NSC BRIEFING

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- I. Danger of post-election violence has been reduced, at least for moment, by agreement signed 27 January between Ydigoras and Cruz.

- B. Agreement motivated by realization that it was perhaps only way to avoid political violence.
1. Ydigoras won clear plurality with 40% of votes compared to Cruz' 30%, according to still unofficial but generally accepted returns. (Leftist Mendez a close third with 29%).
 2. Ydigoras partisans would use force in attempt to counter any decision for Cruz.
 3. But, Ydigoras needs support of Cruz followers in congress.

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

4. Both realize desirability of working together against leftist resurgence.
- C. Agreement could hit snag, in which case serious trouble might still develop.
 1. Residue of pre-election bitterness still strong. Both groups have arms.
 2. However, Interim President Flores and key army officers will probably support agreement.
- II. Ydigoras probably could not establish a repressive dictatorship even if so inclined.
 - A. He would, at least for a time, be checked by:
 1. Officer corps, which is generally moderate-minded.
 2. Congress, where his people will be in minority for at least two years until next congressional elections.
 3. Safeguards in agreement with Cruz.
 - B. Ydigoras has indicated strong opposition to Communism.
 1. Election returns indicate no pre-election Ydigoras-leftist deal.
 2. He might try to use Communists but he seems clever enough to recognize dangers of this.
 3. But Ydigoras shows certain naiveté when he says there are only 30 "dangerous" Communists and the rest are victims of persecution.
- III. Leftist Revolutionary party (PR) emerged as important political force.
 - A. It polled over a quarter of the votes.

25X1 B. Although results of congressional elections still unannounced,



PR won six seats (out of 33 contested -- 66 total).

C. PR strength indicates continued popular attraction to goals of 1944 revolution.

D. PR leaders avowedly anti-Communist, but party is already infiltrated in lower echelons.

E. PR leaders have decided against violence.